Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. 
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ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATION
The MAGTF is the USMC's basis for force organization, and each MAGTF is comprised of four parts: the command element (CE), ground combat element (GCE), aviation combat element (ACE), and logistics combat element (LCE). MAGTFs are organized for specific situations, with no specific structure. In the COE, the Airman's role has moved from purely air power support to the undefined stage. Of course, there are thousands of Airmen directly supporting air power, but many now fill roles historically performed by the Army. The Army is hard pressed to perform the amount of work requested, and its deployments have stretched from six, to 12, to 15-month standard lengths. Over the past six-plus years of GWOT, some Soldiers have deployed more than three times, for over 12 months each time. The DOD has coped through "in-lieu-of" taskings to Airmen, including convoy operations, engineering, and security. USAF leadership continues to argue against these assignments, citing that Airmen should be used as Airmen.
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The problem is, US forces are in the greatest battle of their time, one they were not completely prepared for. In the midst of an Army manpower crisis, the Air Force is a logical place to turn to fill assignments where the Army has dried up.
The above argument speaks mostly to the Air Force's ground support community, which through combat skills familiarization, is positioned to support Army shortfalls. However, an equally important consideration is the aviator's view of the support of ground forces. As previously discussed, historical Air Force leadership was not keen on providing "airborne artillery" for the support of Army units, after fighting so hard to gain independence as a separate service through strategic attack arguments.
14 While this view has softened over the years, it is important that the Air Force operations community continually focuses on the needs on the ground, where the GWOT will ultimately be won.
If the Air Force is to remain a relevant force in winning the GWOT, the support of its aviation and ground support 
